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Abstract 
 This is an essay synthesizing the sociohistorical Gothic theory of Jose Monleon and a 
theory of the grotesque developed by Edwards & Graulund, as applied to Night of the Living 
Dead by George A. Romero. The study begins with a series of general theoretical and synthetic 
treatments of the horror genre culminating in a consideration of the two-act theory of horror 
operation, and proceeds with an application of this theoretical framework to the film Night of the 
Living Dead. This analysis concludes that embedded within this film is an opportunity for critical 
address for the social circumstances of its emergence, and that this potential may be 
generalizable to other works in the horror genre. The work closes with a general discussion of 
findings and concepts for further analysis.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Where do monsters come from? What allows them to work? What do or must audiences 
bring to the experience of horror? Consider a for-instance. You are sitting in a movie theater. 
You’re here with your partner, who has told you this film is “terrifying”, and people are saying 
it’s one of the best horror movies this year. The film begins, and it’s been rolling for about 15 
minutes, when suddenly something emerges from a dank cellar. Or the woods. Or the sky. Or 
from inside a supporting character. What is that thing? It’s half man, half animal, half machine, 
half insect, half luminous cloud. It’s a thing made of contradictions, of fearful combinatorials, 
and it wants the protagonist dead. You are terrified. This monster is libidinous, is cannibalistic, is 
sexually ambiguous, is of questionable origin. It not only wants to destroy the protagonist, it 
wants to bring to an end the American way of life. Or the British way of life. Or the Spanish way 
of life. Luckily, through great effort, the plucky, comfortably normative protagonist (he is 
straight, his provenance is known, he is probably handsome, he is probably a “he”) destroys this 
mass of monstrous contradictions. He gets the girl, the American way is saved, and you feel 
good. On reflection, why? What has allowed this story to so deftly play on your sense of what is 
whole, what is monstrous, and why has its banishment been so satisfying? What did you just see? 
 Questions as to the origins of horror and the horror experience seem often to center on 
what makes a monster. A great variety of theorists have tried their hands at defining what 
constitutes monstrosity, what makes it function, what makes a monster, and why people feel 
compelled to expose themselves to narratives of monstrosity year in and year out. While I think 
many of these theories are useful in their description and operation, I think many of them stop 
short of the kinds of explanation that would make such a discussion truly tractive, and that they 
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instead spend their time in description. Such description is again quite useful, but it doesn’t do 
the whole job.  
 One of the first theorists of the horrific was Ann Radcliff, author of the now seminal 
essay, “The Supernatural in Poetry.” In the form of a dialogue, she allows two of her characters 
to wax theoretical in their experience of Shakespeare, particularly his use of description, clear 
and unclear, to create his emotional effects. Her conversationalists conclude through their 
discussion that the primary difference between horror and terror, two emotions which will be 
made distinct through the history of horror theorization, lies in the level of ambiguity present in 
the representation. Terror is described as a definitional indeterminacy, a sense of unclarity 
preceding the actually experience of its object. In this way, terror is a route to the sublime, itself 
an emotion which combines effect with ambiguity of lack of full knowledge. Horror, in contrast, 
is the experience of the horrific object in its wholeness. If terror is the noise behind the closed 
door, horror is the shambling thing revealed. This same framework has been taken up by other 
theorists, most popularly contemporary horror author Stephen King, in his book Danse Macabre, 
where he makes a further distinction between Horror and Gross-Out. Radcliffe’s distinction is 
instructive. This thesis will concern itself primarily with the second element she considers, 
Horror, insofar as it will primarily be addressed not to the experience of horror, but to the reality 
of horrific objects. In Radcliffe’s terminology, I will primarily be concerned with Horror rather 
than Terror.  
 Whence then comes Horror? As mentioned above, while true explanations of the 
emergence of horrific imagery, the “origin story” of monsters, is a rarity, a great many writers 
have described monsters and their qualities in phenomenal depth. While there is a great deal of 
accord in these descriptions, they do diverge at points. Philosopher Noel Carroll’s description of 
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monsters centers on their status as “category violations,” uniting domains or categories of human 
thought that should not go together. Anthropologist David Gilmore describes them instead as 
possessing recognizably human traits, even if these traits remain as limited as the possession of 
agency, though possessing at least one quality that is blown out of proportion. Monstrous teeth or 
claws quite often serve this purpose. Medievalist Jeffrey Cohen does not give a comprehensive 
definition, instead describing monsters according to their participation in a field of qualities, 
esconcing these in Seven Theses, including such elements as, “The Monstrous Body is the 
Cultural Body,” and “The Monster is a Harbinger of Category Crisis.” His description, as with 
the other theorists mentioned, seem to describe monsters both according to their qualities and 
according to what they “do.” Jose Monleon, who I will be using for the majority of my treatment, 
describes monsters somewhat according to Cohen’s “cultural body” thesis, identifying them as 
reflections or representations of cultural designations centering on contribution or lack of 
contribution to wider cultural aims.  
There are some useful commonalities between these definitions. First and foremost, all of 
these theorists define monsters according to their bringing together of incompatible elements. 
Monsters should not be, within a traditional model of the universe, or at least they should not be 
as they are. Whether the elements a monster brings together in a single agent are exaggerations 
or modifications of elements which may natively belong together, or whether they are more 
radical composites uniting qualities which should never be brought together in a single figure, 
they are in every instance a confluence of incompatible parts. Secondly, this combinatoriality 
makes monsters threatening. It’s not enough that a figure unite two elements that should not go 
together--this coming together must constitute something of a threat to their observers. Monsters 
must be seen, and they must be seen as dangerous.  
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This is a very good description of what monsters are and what they look like, and its 
elements are shared to a great extent between theorists coming from a good variety of academic 
fields. What it is not, however, is an explanation of how monsters emerge. To touch on the two 
elements common to theoretical definitions, what is it that allows us to identify a monster as 
constituting a categorical violation, a combination which should not be? And according to what 
criteria can such a representation be considered threatening? These questions are necessary 
preconditions for what may become a more interesting question: How have monsters been 
deployed in the past for critical effect? That is, knowing the raison d'etre of monstrosity is the 
elicitation of terror and horror, how have artists used an expectation of this effect in order to 
deploy imagery with a critical cultural effect?  
This thesis will attempt to synthesize a potential answer to the above three questions. In 
the present work, I will first explore the sociohistorical operation of the horror genre within an 
historical context using theorist Jose Monleon’s concept of “unreason” through a theory of the 
grotesque. This will consist of an exploration and some instantiations of Monleon’s theory, as 
well as an exploration of how this theory interacts with the broader conception of a grotesque 
aesthetic. I will then explore how the operation of this sociohistorical function relies upon 
systems of audience knowledge and presupposition. To do this, I will rely on theories of 
intertextuality, as well as the work of rhetorician Kendall Phillips in order to understand how the 
presuppositional structure of the horror genre may open the way for critical effect. To provide an 
artifactual backbone, to these theoretical considerations, I will ground my analysis in an 
occasional analysis of the film Night of the Living Dead by George A. Romero. 
Horror has been theorized as long as it’s been a recognized genre, and as such I have no 
expectation that I will close any book whatsoever in this conversation. As is apparent in 
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examining the commonalities between theorists of the monstrous, even those coming from 
entirely distinct disciplines, I believe many theorists are describing the same phenomena in their 
work, and I will retread much ground that has already been trod here. However, I will attempt 
within this work to synthesize something a bit new, to integrated a number of theoretical 
perspectives to internally consistently answer our three questions--What categories do monsters 
violate? What makes these violations threatening? How has this been used to critical effect? If I 
am able to construct something like a coherent synthesis capable of answering these question 
without mishandling the vast theoretical lore that the horror genre has generated, I think I will 
have accomplished something.  
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Chapter 2: Horror as Sociohistorical Grotesque 
In this chapter, I’ll adumbrate theorist, critic, and Spanish-language author Jose 
Monleon’s approach to the sociohistorical evolution of the Gothic genre and its passage through 
distinct relationships with the social body. I’ll then briefly explore this theory as an interpretation 
or instantiation of the Grotesque, derived from Edwards and Graulund’s formulation (as well as 
those of others), in order to understand the shifts in representation through Monleon’s epochs.  
Monleon and Sustained Unreason 
In A Specter is Haunting Europe, Jose Monleon’s only significant work translated into 
English, he takes an approach to the gothic genre situated in terms of its historical evolution 
against the events of the emerging era of industrialism within which it flourished. He 
characterizes the development of notions of the supernatural gothic genre as located within a 
broader social context informing possible locations of the monstrous. To accomplish this, he 
borrows Todorov’s characterization of the fantastic to refer to gothic monstrosity (Monleon 3). 
According to his account, at the time of the earliest works of Gothic fiction, monstrosity is 
essentially an artifact of the outskirts, something that occurs in poor-houses and mad-houses and 
work-houses (30-31). Each of these is a habitation designed to contain, confine, and delimit the 
location of that which is conceived of as threateningly external. As the age progresses, however, 
and as industrialism takes root within England, this strict locationality begins to decay, and the 
monstrous externality of the poor, the mad, the criminal, is gradually reintegrated with society. 
This is accompanied by a shift in the ways the culture conceived of the monstrous. From a 
phenomenon of the outskirts, the fantastic and monstrous, that which was characterized by a 
spirit of unreason, was found to be implicit in the very structures of order according to which 
culture operated. Within fantastic literary output, this shift was reflected through portrayals of 
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monstrosity which originated from within the body of society itself. Reason became the birthing 
place of unreason. 
While Monleon’s approach to these concepts emerges as essentially economic, it not a 
stretch to extend them to cultural categories as such. Within his treatment, Monleon identifies the 
unreason he describes with absence of utility or belonging within the economic systems within 
the cultures he describes. What this means is that the poor, the indigent, the mentally ill who 
exemplify the kinds of unreasoned actors who find their way into representations of the Gothic 
monstrous are characterized as such by virtue of their lack of placement within the society at 
large. Within the machinery of Victorian England, those who were useless seemed to defy the 
subjectivizing and ordering logic of the industrial ethos, embodying an impossibility of category 
which therefore placed them in tension with the culture which created them. The character by 
which these individuals are therefore in conflict with the machinery of the culture in which they 
live but cannot economically participate seems to be an instantiation of a broader impossibility of 
belonging. Either economically or otherwise, this seems to be an instance of the “othering” of 
those for whom there is no place, a phenomenon certainly not limited to the realm of the 
economic.  
It would seem intuitive that order, either economic or social,  would have to exist as a 
precedent to the emergence of disorder--it’s not a coincidence that the gothic genre as identified 
by Monleon only began to exist at the emergence of enlightenment thinking, a paradigm which 
envisioned the world as an ordered system in which humans might be rational participants. 
Monleon’s evolution inward seems to reflect the increasing immanence of the unreason he 
describes as the culture becomes increasingly ordered, increasingly coherent. As the society 
evolves into greater and greater manifestations of social order, more and more is consumed, is 
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normalized, is foreclosed, resulting in a system in which nothing is rejected, nothing is on the 
“outside.” Though nothing then exists on the outside, monstrosity remains. Crime, poverty, 
instability, violence--each of these persists as a cultural reality, a site of internal contradiction 
within the cultural substrate. It is almost as though the need to place these monstrous elements 
within a culture led to an ever-intensifying cultural anxiety as to the location of monstrosity. 
What was once safely on the outskirts, blameable and distant, suddenly erupted from within the 
cultural heart. Absent a safely identifiable externality, the culture had no choice but to find 
unreason within its own heart.  
Monleon himself contextualizes his approach to the Gothic within Todorov’s fantastic, 
which is that synaptic time between the presentation of the ambiguously fantastical and its 
collapse either into true fantasy or its revelation as an explicable illusion (Todorov 25). As such, 
the fantastic is characterized as a suspended unreason, an indeterminacy. Monleon doesn’t argue 
but instead suggests in the scope of his survey that this fantastic is most often experienced as 
horrific. Just as the fantastic is defined as that space of unknowing, so horror does not inhere 
within objects and agents, per se, but in the uncertainty, the violation potentiated in their 
discategoricity. In this regard, Monleon’s interpretation of Todorov echoes contemporary 
theorists of the horror genre. One such is Noel Carroll, who identifies horror not only with 
monsters who are grotesque, who transect and disrupt traditional categories, but also with the 
“curiosity” felt by readers and viewers to make sense of this categorical violation (Carroll 182). 
The emotional impetus of this horror and of the fantastic is then to collapse disorder, to 
disassemble and reorder the unreason of these representations. 
To put a term to this indeterminacy, one might be able to recognize the existence of 
Monleon’s unreasoned Gothic as a categorical insolubility. To borrow from Carroll again, the 
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monstrous is not that which is merely threatening, merely problematic, merely antagonistic. The 
hallmark of the horrific instead is that which defies even such a definitive categorization. To 
approach the horrific, the Gothic, isn’t merely to approach that which is an object of fear. The 
kind of fear which would be necessary to characterize a phenomenon as truly horrific would be 
that which derives its quality of fear from its very “wrongness.” Such a notion of the horrific 
finds some backing in the enlightenment ideal itself. In the dream of an ordered world, in a 
culture which finds its sense of identity even within and through the application of reason, of 
order, would not the ability of an entity or representation to defy this categorization itself 
embody the terrifying par-excellence? In such an interpretation, the certainty of death or harm 
would not be horrific--the truly horrific would defy even the certainty of destruction.  
While this is a useful way to imagine the relations between culture and literature as they 
evolved through the Gothic, what might these shifts in portrayal mean for the categories against 
which the horrific fantastic was written? If the horrific fantastic is a function, as Monleon argues, 
of unreason, then what is the character of this unreason, and how might it be deployed in 
addressing itself to the reasoned categoricities of the culture at large? 
The Unreasoned as Grotesque 
The grotesque offers a useful way of responding to this question. Edwards and Graulund 
characterize the grotesque as that aesthetic that emerges from the combination of contradictory 
elements, the bombastic and unexpected, the definitionally discategorical (Edwards and 
Graulund 16). Within a grotesque aesthetic, categories are pressed together to the breaking point, 
made to play unkindly with their peers, such that through a violation of order, disorder is able to 
express forms of truth about the violated categories in a manner unavailable to traditional 
expression. The grotesque is then an aesthetic of essential unreason, of disruption and fantasy, 
13 
 
even when those fantasies are essentially un-fantastic. Not only does the grotesque allow the 
expression of hidden figures of reason through deployment of unreason, but these expressions 
are often unavailable to a traditional aesthetic. By portraying the contradictions inherent within a 
culture, either ontologically or traditionally, the grotesque forces a reassessment of the 
relationship between these combinatorials (Edwards and Graulund 3). To formulate it neatly, the 
grotesque uses what is available and contradictory in order to express that which is true and 
unavailable.  
 A few words are justified here pursuant to the relationship between the grotesque and the 
wider culture. If the grotesque is that aesthetic which combines elements which fall outside 
traditional cultural schemes of what is allowed to be appended to what, where do these 
conceptions come from? Let’s say we are discussing a classical representation of monstrosity--a 
werewolf perhaps. Analysis of this sort will be carried on in greater length below, but what is it 
about the two elements so combined--wolf and man--that disqualifies them from unity within our 
cultural scheme? The answer to this question is entirely contingent upon the cultural milieu into 
which these representations enter. They are, in other words, entirely conventional.  
 For example, although a cultural rule against human/animal hybridity exists within our 
knowledge-culture, it does not inhere everywhere. It is, in a phrase, conventional rather than 
axiomatic. In many cultures, historically and today, human/animal hybrids are believed to exist, 
are understood to exist in the same axiomatic sense mentioned above. To counter this notion by 
suggesting that we (that is, those of us in the intellectually industrialized Western World) “have 
it right” as regards the proper prescription as to what might might-not properly go together runs 
into another issue. This second problem is that such a notion fails to account for problematic 
combinatorialities that exist within our culture, but which our conventions of eliding particularity 
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for the sake of an easily generalizable “truth” have rendered as existing outside that 
conventionality. For example, documents legislating the proper use of animal tissues in human 
medical therapies have existed in the EU for at least a decade. However, because of our 
conventions for naming these processes and realities, and because of the localized knowledge-
systems in which these ideas are stored and abstracted, we are able to keep from running up 
against any cultural rule against hybridity which might render such medical processes 
grotesque.The grotesque is therefore the terminology I will use here to describe those images 
which directly contradict only culturally prevalent and not absolute notions of proper 
combinatoriality.  
 This aside opens up space for another discussion: are representations of the grotesque 
limited to agents or monsters in the traditional sense, or are such threatening combinatorialities 
capable of existing disarticulated from agentive representation? That is, although two elements 
which ought not go together are easily combined within a single agent, a single image, is this the 
only place they may combine? Going briefly back to our theoretical overview, if we are to take 
as a representative of the categorical violation our terminology grotesque, and if monstrosity 
would seem to emerge when this grotesquery is put into combination with an air of threat, where 
might this combination--problematic combination and threat--inhere in our culture outside 
traditional representations of horror imagery? 
 If the characteristics that define a horror monster are disarticulated from agents and are 
allowed to be identified within the culture at large, then horror quickly becomes something more 
complex and less encapsulable. Philosopher George Sieg describes such a possibility in his work 
“Infinite Regress.” According to such a disarticulation, horror as a psychological experience of 
threatening combinatoriality is synonymous with its very possibility. That is, the very idea that 
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there is something unpredictably and unknowably “horrific” out there is itself experienced as 
horrific. As such, Sieg argues, horror has a self-compounding quality unique among aesthetic 
experiences. If we are to accept such a theory, it would mean that the grotesque, and horror by 
extension, are best imagined as the very awareness of the possibility of themselves. While it may 
be easiest to identify the grotesquery or horror of a specific agent, nameable monster, the 
experience of the grotesque or horrific is not strictly limited to artistic representations, but 
instead may inhere in our experience of reality, including our sociohistorical reality.  
The grotesque, in its more limited aesthetic sense, has been used in the past as a means of 
understanding the output of the Gothic era, but not extensively. Novak has used the Grotesque as 
a means of illuminating the contrast between Gothic and the sublime. While the sublime, 
similarly to the grotesque, trucks in the expression of that which is inexpressible through what 
resources are available, the grotesque differs qualitatively in the kinds of emotions thus revealed. 
If the grotesque leads to a sublimity, it’s within a negative sublime, where disorder and 
disruption are experienced as a concealed truth (Novak 59). The ineffable bucolic then becomes 
something more akin to a desolate revelation, and traditional, mundane beauty must be negated 
through defilement and disruption in order to reveal concealed aesthetic truths. Bakhtin’s 
treatment of the carnivalesque may also be seen as a kind of grotesque, though not overtly (10), 
although he does notably address theories of the grotesque as expressed on bodies later in the 
same work (303). Through the inversion of traditioned orders, the grotesque may argue, the truth 
of those orders is revealed and reinforced. The violation, the transgression, the unreason, 
provides the backdrop against which such inversion is capable of expressing what traditional 
aesthetics are not. The crowned jester is made grotesque, and through this grotesquery we 
question the epistemic domains of clown and crown, so to speak.  
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There have been variable explorations of the grotesque which have emphasized different 
elements of these representation. While the approach I’ve chosen emphasizes the contradictory 
elements of grotesque representation, other theorists have indicated that through its historical 
usage, the grotesque has come to be usable to describe anything from a two-headed toad to a 
Higher Truth (Harpham, 467). Other theorists have emphasized the role of the comic or the 
absurd in tempering grotesque representations, even going so far as to indicate that this 
absurdity--a gentle neutering of threat--is a necessary requisite to the existence of a grotesque 
representation (Stieg, 258). I have adopted the more simplified, non-synthetic interpretation of 
the concept here in order to emphasize what I believe to be its most essential element: the 
combination within an aesthetic of two elements which do not belong together in order to 
accomplish an objective otherwise unavailable. In this way, the grotesque bears a passing 
resemblance to the sublime, an aesthetic tradition with an analogous history of divergent 
interpretation, a resemblance which other theorists have noted (Chao). As I said, I will stand by a 
more streamlined definition for ease of use, but it bears being said that other theorists have 
variously complexified this relatively simple super-structure.  
What new relations might be revealed if we bring together Monleon’s diachronic 
treatment of fantastic fiction and Edwards and Graulund’s treatment of the grotesque? Each of 
the movements through which Monleon’s theory passes becomes a different site for imagining 
an operation of the grotesque. From the earliest stages of the Monleon’s Gothic, monstrosity is 
situated on the outskirts of society, cloaked in age and decrepitude. The Castle of Otranto is the 
example he gives. The grotesquery at work in such portrayals, the categorical contradiction, 
emerges at the uncomfortable suture between past and present. What is monstrous in these 
portrayals is the coming together of progress and history in disharmony, and a grotesque reading 
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would demand a questioning of the categoricity of each of these domains. If the past and present 
collide violently, horrifically, what is it in their natures which demands such a violent response? 
Monleon’s contention would be that these collisions exemplify a conflict between old social 
orders and emergent enlightenment ideals (32). The enlightenment, through seeking an absolute 
capture through the rejection of dis-order, un-reason, jettisons the past as inherently dangerous 
and retrograde. This changes during the middle and late Gothic. In these works, monstrosity, and 
so the foundations for the grotesque, are resituated as emerging from within the social body. No 
longer are monsters on the outskirts--they’re in the house. The grotesque within the mid-
Victorian era, during the age of gothic production after the turn of the Nineteenth century, 
constitutes a nightmare of enlightenment. If the Enlightenment’s capture can’t exorcise the 
demons of grotesquery, they must emerge from the premises of the enlightenment impulse itself.  
If the originary agents of unreason, as explored by Monleon, are those who fell through 
the cracks of ordering impulses of the industrializing age, how might a grotesque theorizing of 
their status illuminate the qualities according to which they find themselves in conflict with the 
culture which created them? What descriptors do these people possess which transforms them 
into inherent contradictions? They obviously are not monstrous in any traditional understanding 
of the word. They possess an identifiable humanity, agency, bodies, names. This very fact of 
their humanity, however, may be of of the two elements of their identity which finds itself in 
conflict within a grotesque interpretation. If one element of their grotesquery is their humanity, 
what might find itself in inherent contradiction with their status as human? The answer to this 
question is their very defiance of the systems of human-subjectivizing which was the bar-for-
entry for humanity during an era when humanity was identified with industry. They are human--
body, mind, soul. They are inhuman--economically useless, lacking ability to contribute to the 
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social body. Within Monleon’s interpretation of sociohistorical unreason, the grotesque person is 
no more or less than he or she who is useless.  
Some Instances of the Grotesque 
While this interpretation of unreason as an operation of the grotesque has a degree of 
intuitive appeal, an illustration may be necessary to see how this relation has persisted through 
works of the gothic and horrific fiction during the time period about which Monleon wrote. The 
purpose of the following will be to track this evolutionary movement within the changing 
premises of the Gothic through three works of mid-to-late Gothic fiction. The works which have 
been selected for this task were picked for their varying representation for the origins of 
monstrosity: from within, from space between, and from without. Each of the works considered 
here fall within the purview of industrialized Gothicism as identified by Monleon--however, 
because he only considers a single one of these works within his treatment, the variability of the 
ways in which monstrosity– grotesquery– expressed itself is left ambiguous. 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, published anonymously in 1818, is the exemplar Monleon 
uses to explore the industrialized Gothic, citing the emergence of monstrosity from within the 
premises of normativity. Victor Frankenstein does not encounter monstrosity on the outskirts, but 
instead becomes the architect of a more localized rarefaction. Within this work, Frankenstein 
does not discover the monster within a periphery, or even have its reality foist upon him. Rather, 
he creates this representation of the monstrous. The ease with which modern readers and 
commentators collapse man and monster--each of whom is commonly referred to as 
“Frankenstein”--is itself a small testament to the identification between monster and man, 
unreason and reason 
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To apply a grotesque interpretation to this monstrosity would begin with the question, 
what is thrown into conflict? Where does discategoricity inhere? In the case of Frankenstein’s 
monster, an obvious answer might be the union of medicalized death and medicalized life. With 
industrialization in Europe came the industrialization of medicality, a perception of the body as 
machine. This dual expression of human nature, as both machine and mind, agent and 
automaton, can be seen as a manifestation of monstrosity, pointing to a contradiction seated 
within the heart of what it is to be thinking flesh. This is a perspective popularized lately by 
modern Gothic author Thomas Ligotti. To his approach, life itself becomes grotesque in its 
collapse of agent and non-agent. Once minds may become untethered from bodies, how does one 
differentiate herself from the nameless monster’s Grotesque conceptual collapse? 
This theme of monstrous locationality is not limited to ontologically impossible agents. 
Wuthering Heights was published in 1847, only a year before Emily Bronte--who published the 
work under a pseudonym--passed away. For all this work’s passage through time, its locale is 
oppressively isolated. Shuttling essentially between two locations, two estates estranged by the 
eerie moors, this story is a primer in the ability to create sensations of distance and isolation 
within locality. The story’s characters, confusing as they do an internalistic respectability and 
alienating otherness, become monstrous even as they participate in tropes located at the heart of 
standard Victorian fare. In fact, they could not be monstrous if they were not at once so familiar.  
The grotesquery portrayed in Wuthering Heights is a bit more difficult to locate, situated 
as it is within a concatenation of foreignness and locality--Heathcliff’s foreign birth and adoption 
makes him an agentive contradiction, a Weird character in the sense used by Mark Fisher, as a 
union of two elements that simply do not go together--his presence evokes an indefinable unease. 
This work also participates in Fisher’s theory of the Eerie, the presence or absence of that which 
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should or should not be so. Geoffrey Harpham has argued that the grotesque functions most 
effectively when the world into which it enters is largely normative. The creation of the eerie 
seems to suggest this same necessity--how can abnormality be portrayed, how can unreason be 
outlined, without the backdrop of reasonable expectation? Heathcliff does not simply become a 
monstrous outsider--he is situated as a consummate insider, though grotesquely so. He is landed, 
and his situation within the novel suggests an inversion, a perversion of the function normally 
reserved for a normative character. 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula, published in 1897, continues the trend toward portrayals of 
localized externality, though in a two-handed fashion; while the story begins in a locale 
reminiscent of Monleon’s pre-Industrial Gothic, all drooping cobwebs and eclectic castles, these 
representations then invade Jonathan Harker’s normalized world. As Dracula moves into 
London, he brings corruption with him, not only as a material reality, but as a conversion 
experience. He is not simply an agent of unreason, but a disseminator of abnormality. Even the 
fixtures with which he arrives on Western shores indicate this nature--wolves, bats, and rats all 
harken his arrival, as though the plague-infested old-world had come to despoil a modern age.  
Count Dracula’s categorical grotesqueries are quite standard for the horror genre, uniting 
as he does notions of consumption and sexuality, death and life, foreignness and immanence. 
One way in which this representation differs, however, is in the capacity of this externality to 
pollute. Dracula’s curse and so the primary signifier of his ontologically foreign nature, spreads 
to others, invades and converts the local to this radical outsider status. To illuminate this move, 
Kristeva’s formulation of the abject appears early through imagery that is grotesque with 
reference to normal bodies--filth, waste, dung, spasm, vomiting (2). These effects don’t simply 
exist as additional objects, as the monstrosity of Dracula couldn’t simply exist as another 
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Western subject. The grotesque abject threatens to collapse those systems of order into which it 
irrupts, a conversion of reason to unreason, an unholy collapse.  
What then do these representations have in common? Is it possible to come to any 
conclusion regarding the grotesque representations of these novels within their historical 
context? While it’s difficult to draw any sweeping conclusions from such a small set, it does 
seem to be the case that these works carry out Monleon’s assertion as to the particular nature of 
Industrial Gothic. In each of these stories, on contrast to pre-Industrial Gothicism, the monstrous 
representations seem to spill into, to merge with the normalized social body. In contrast to 
preceding Gothic forms, where the story was either situated in or projected back into an exotic 
world, often alienated in both time and space, these works bring the monstrous home, so to 
speak, seeming to collapse and complicate notions of internal and external.  
What of this collapse as a grotesque representation? If the incongruous categories brought 
into conflict to constitute the Industrial Gothic are internality and externality, a grotesque 
aesthetic interpretation would ask the question, what of these categories? Is the very possibility 
of their unity a suggestion of their mutability? In his work on monstrosity, anthropologist David 
Gilmore has suggested that cultures permit monsters to transgress culturally cherished 
boundaries in order to exemplify concepts of threat. From this vantage point, it would seem to be 
the case that this concept of internality is just such a cherished boundary. Drawing from Mary 
Douglas’s work, particularly Purity and Danger, Gilmore has suggested that such portrayals and 
stories of transgression serve a reaffirming role, function as a ritual impurity which, through 
banishment, reinforces such categories as internal/external, foreign/local. Representations of the 
Grotesque then become sites simultaneously for questioning the categorical limitations of 
boundary and for reaffirming the stability of these demarcations.  
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Chapter 3:  Horrific Assumptions and Horrific Effect 
The previous chapter has been devoted to identifying unreason as instantiation of a 
grotesque aesthetic, as well as how this conceptualization allows us to imagine horrific 
representations as embodying contradictions within the social body. The question remains: how 
do audiences approach this contradiction? How is such contradiction activated within audiences? 
This chapter will then be devoted to understanding the two-step operation of audience 
presupposition, its reliance upon audience knowledge. Within this operation, I will also explore 
the potential opened for critical effect, the possibility of breaking away from the reactionary 
architectures of the monstrous as cultural contradiction. 
Two-Act Horror and the Possibility of Effect 
Historically, the horror genre tends to be reactionary, overdetermined, and defined by a 
relationship to its subject matter that leaves little space for rhetorical mobility. Horror is a space 
of what Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as the “carnivalesque,” a place in which violation is allowed 
because it is to be quashed (5-8). In many ways, the history of the horror genre is a history of 
reactionary politics, profoundly conservative morality, and an almost obsessive fixation on 
normativity. If horror can be thought of as a genre of “ritual defilement,” then the reason it is 
tolerable--and even enjoyable, for some--is because it holds out the potential for a return to 
normalcy. This return is almost always a reaffirmation of what is “real” or “normative,” a 
repudiation of the abnormality which constitutes horrific antagonism. Not only are the objects 
which populate horror narrative surprisingly consistent through its history, but so too are the 
narrative reactions to it. Vampires, hauntings, possessions have been treated overwhelmingly 
similarly since the beginning of the horror genre as follows: the choice is destruction or 
integration.  
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The kinds of recurring objects which populate the genre may be, however, the source of 
its critical potential. The reason for the special power the horror genre possesses is its making of 
statements with ontological impact--horror makes claims about reality via presentation of 
unreality, and it makes value judgments about those statements. Carroll makes a distinction 
between the kinds of statements made by horror and other thriller genres. According to 
Paradoxes of the Heart, his theoretical analysis of art-horror, Carroll claims horror possesses a 
specialized status as a genre in part because it does not simply make statements about what is 
not, as any fictionalized narrative does, but instead makes statements about what cannot possibly 
be (16). This distinction is accompanied within art-horror by a particular protagonistic 
orientation toward the objects of these statements: the emotion of fear. This is what sets horror 
apart from mere fantasy. Historian Farah Mendlesohn identifies the general class of fantasy to 
which horror belongs, the intrusion fantasy, in which unreality or impossibility presses itself 
forcibly into a widely normative world (115). However, to take Carroll’s framework, these 
unreal objects are not sufficient unto themselves to define a narrative as horrific--there must also 
be a judgment, or a specific and evaluative emotional response (16-17). 
An issue in this line of argument presents itself. Critics have sometimes addressed the 
question as to whether or not horror is even capable of articulating ideological or social critique. 
After all, if the statements horror makes are about things not found in any reality, and if the 
judgments it makes about these statements are almost uniformly normative, then can it be 
claimed that such statements are capable of affecting an audience’s notions of normalcy and 
response? Horror theorist Noel Carroll would, problematically, respond in the negative to this 
question. He would state that the horror genre is neutered in terms of its potential for social 
critique by the same component that gives it distinction. Because the horror genre makes 
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judgments about statements that “cannot possibly be,”--i.e. wolf-men, vampires, ghostly dolls--
these judgments are about nothing at all (199-201). After all, what does it matter if I say that 
ghostly dolls are threateningly grotesque and should be destroyed? A ghostly doll has never run 
for congress, and I’m not likely to encounter any such ontological aberration in my own life.  
One issue with Carroll’s response is that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the cultural 
categories on which his distinction rests are significantly more culture-bound than he admits in 
his treatment. While haunted dolls do not exist in our culture, they may exist in another culture. 
Conversely, things which we may claim objectively exist within our culture may be in the realm 
of fantasy for another. Almost any modern form of technology would seem supernatural to 
anyone alive fifty years ago, and to many people who still live in largely pre-technological 
cultures. Carroll’s claim that the judgments of art-horror are neutered by the ontological 
categories to which the judged objects/statements belong is undercut by the socially constructed 
nature of these categories. He neatly bypasses this issue by labeling works which truck in horrific 
effect without ontic violation “thrillers,” a distinction which he acknowledges as arbitrary, but 
the line must be somewhere, right? 
Still other theorists have sidestepped this issue of unreality entirely and claimed that it is 
instead horror’s unique relationship with themes of existentialism and ontological 
discombobulation which make it a prime site for this kind of cultural understanding. Philosopher 
Stuart Hanscomb claims existential theory can be understood as horrific, or that our 
understanding of an existential perspective can be enhanced by an understanding of how horror 
operates, given the tendency of each subject to dramatize and destabilize our relationship with 
reality and our place within it (1-6). Philosopher Eugene Thacker has gone even further in this 
direction, and argues in In the Dust of this Planet that horror is itself an existential tool for 
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coming to terms with the idea of a “world without-us” (8-9). To both of these theorists, horror is 
seen as existentially therapeutic, given the emotions or worldview embedded within its treatment 
of violation. 
The modern horror genre has at times attempted to bear out the optimistic perspective as 
to horror’s potency for cultural effect. Contemporary horror has demonstrated a powerful interest 
in and potential for social impact, with such films as Get Out drawing massive crowds while 
simultaneously using the horror space to generate social critique. In Get Out, a black man is 
brought to meet his white girlfriend’s family on their palatial estate. It’s only after he arrives that 
he realizes something dreadful is afoot, and he narrowly escapes losing his mind—quite literally-
-to the twisted desires of the whitewashed antagonists. His unawares manipulation by the white 
characters of the film then mirrors the subtle and not-so-subtle manipulation African-Americans 
may experience in normative White culture at large. Here the horror genre can be understood as 
using audience understanding of one form of manipulation in order to illuminate the other.  
This use of audience knowledge to leverage effect is not new. Historically, horror has 
repeatedly used the expectations which come with its labelling to address itself directly to the 
ideology of its audiences. The horror genre has always been powerfully intertextual, and has 
frequently drawn on what rhetorician James Porter refers to as “presupposition” for 
comprehensibility (35-36). That is, horror often makes demands on the audience to bring certain 
forms of knowledge, genre-keyed understanding, to their experience of art-horror. Audiences 
who fail to bring this knowledge are often left out of the full modern horror experience, 
particularly in contemporary examples from the genre, when the conventions and operations of 
horror narrative themselves become objects of address. The rigorous intertextuality of much 
modern horror nearly demands an audience schooled in horror convention. Who will live? Who 
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will die? Where will the ghoul strike next? It is the suite of answers to such questions that form a 
substrate of generic expectation out of which much contemporary horror story operates.  
Presupposition doesn’t only operate on the level of meta-narrativity, however. Because 
horror is a genre of specific audience response, generally fear, it often relies on violation of 
audience expectation in order to function. A natural question is how this can occur in a genre 
seemingly so reactionary and entrenched in tradition. If horror relies on violational statements for 
effect, how can such violation occur within such a small selection of tropes? There are two 
responses to this, both of which answer this conundrum by pointing to changes within the horror 
genre itself. These two forms of change could be termed inter-generic and intra-generic. The 
former is that which occurs when one genre begins spill into another, as when a film promises 
romance only to subvert the audience’s romantic expectation with horrific effect. The latter is 
that which occurs when an element within the genre itself shifts or intensifies, as when each new 
iteration of a horror franchise ups the ante in terms of blood, guts, or effects. In either case, 
horror relies on a great deal of presuppositional knowledge in its audiences in order to function 
properly. This wealth of knowledge, as I will show, serves as the jumping off point for horror’s 
possible effects.  
Horror then operates by presenting the audience with a statement in the form of a horrific 
presentation, then judges this statement and disposes of it accordingly. Not only this, but horror 
also relies on the audience’s expectations for what kinds of statements constitute this horrific 
class and what kinds of judgment are appropriate thereto. This one-two generic punch has been 
imagined by numerous theorists to be a site of social impact. 
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The Rhetorical Maneuver and Horrific Criticality 
In further understanding the play between expectation and delivery, and how this play 
may become a site for critical effect, it may be useful to step for a moment into rhetorical 
territory. Kendall Phillips articulated what he referred to as the “rhetorical maneuver” in order to 
resolve what he saw as an inherent tension within postmodern notions of subjectivity. According 
to Phillips, postmodernism motivated a replacement of traditional notions of personal identity 
with a new idea of subjectivity. Within this framework, identity is simultaneously fluid and 
multiple, while at the same time determined by context and social disciplinarity (310-312). In 
order to account for this dual-nature of fluidity and overdetermination, Phillips devised the 
rhetorical maneuver to describe the space which opens between determination and deployment 
within the operation of subjectivity. He posits the instance of identity as a specific, context-
bound “position,” into which a subjectivity is performed as “form” (312-317). Position is then 
the situational space for identity to occupy, say as a teacher or student, while form is the specific 
performance within that space which may or may not cohere with the expected performance. The 
rhetorical maneuver, as Phillips describes it, occurs when an individual deploys a form not 
appropriate to the social position specified by context (317-318). As, to use his example, when a 
student deploys the form of “new father” in order to request additional time on a school 
assignment. He has stepped outside the expected student position, and subverted expectation by 
delivering a subject form of “new father.” 
In order to understand how the rhetorical maneuver can be applied to genre deployment, 
it’s necessary to understand the structure of subjectivity as portrayed by Phillips as a dialectic of 
expectation and delivery. The maneuver occurs in time. He characterizes that which precedes the 
form of deployment, the position, as something which temporally precedes the deployed form of 
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the subjective performance (Phillips 319-320). Put another way, Phillips’ rhetorical maneuver 
assumes presupposition on the part of the audience and rhetorically subverts this expectation to 
bring about a specific effect. In the case of Phillips’ example, this is more time on an assignment. 
In the case of the horror genre, it is possibility of critical effect in the audience. 
If subjectivity is seen as a kind of per-form-ance within an expected position, then the 
horror genre, as its own kind of performance, can be seen as responding to the disciplinarity of 
audience requirements to possess the label horror--genre, to borrow a term, must be hailed as 
such. In other words, both subjectivity and genre are best understood as dynamics of expectation 
and delivery along disciplinary lines. If this is so, the horror genre is a specialized kind of genre-
subject which is defined by its self-conscious adherence the expectations which precede it. A 
horrific genre-subjectivity would be one which is defined by its insistence on always delivering 
on audience expectation in a two-part performance: horrific statement and narratorial judgment. 
If we allow the preceding use of Phillips’ framework to understand performance broadly, 
we have opened up a new means of understanding not only the violational operation of the horror 
genre, but violation more broadly. By making this turn, we are enabled to see Phillips’ rhetorical 
maneuver as a means of conceptualizing transgressive expression generally within spaces of 
determined expectation, and horror as only a specialized instance of this possibility. In this 
framework, a transgressive communication would be any whose form deviates from the 
expectational position which precedes it. The horror genre is distinguished in this case by the fact 
that it makes statements not only about it’s narratorial objects, but concerns these objects with 
violation of what is considered possible. 
Genre theory can also be used to understand this transition. Rhetorician Carolyn Miller’s 
concept of genre as structuration within rhetorical community can be imagined as the position 
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within which a genre piece’s form is deployed (70-71). In Miller’s theory, genre is the 
reproducible network of communicative elements which have become traditionalized within a 
culture for creating particular effects. Almost like brain-synapses, these tradition-worn pathways 
of expression constitute the call which specific pieces of communication answer, and so are 
made comprehensible (71-72). If one imagines this illustration overlaid on the position vs. form 
contrast which Phillips specifies, the distinction between recognizable-as and possible, real-
world expression-of would become the space between Phillips’ position and form.  
The horror genre is in no way privileged in the ways in which it can be understood 
through this specific lens of expectation and delivery. That said, while it is not privileged in 
being able to be understood in these terms, it is interesting as a genre which specifically concerns 
itself with violations of what is possible, in Carroll’s terms. In this way, it bears a certain 
resemblance to the avant-garde. Similarly to the problems briefly mentioned above, theoretician 
Thomas Docherty describes in his introduction to Postmodernism: A Reader the problem 
inherent in a genre/form which relies upon violation of expectation for its effect (14-16). If the 
avant-garde is always violational, is it violational at all? Isn’t this perpetual expectation for 
violation a kind of stability which presses up against the avant-garde’s raison d’etre--to always 
violate? More significantly, how does this problem compare with the problem of horror, which 
must always frighten through means of ontological violation?  
The difference between the problem of horror and the problem of the avant-garde is to be 
found in the distinction between where violation is found in each. While the avant-garde may 
find its violation in the whole of its structure, from form to subject to presentation, horror 
benefits from controlling its variable surrounding the ontological irruption as much as possible. 
When Mendlesohn cites the horror genre as belonging to the super-genre of intrusive fantasy, she 
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makes an important observation: what intrudes is only considered an intrusion because it enters a 
normative world, though, she concedes, this normative world need not be our own (114). While 
the avant-garde always a delivers an experience which subverts expectations, horror delivers an 
experience which delivers upon expectation enough to establish the world as normative, only 
then delivering an ontologically violational element.  
An illustrative counterexample may be useful. The popular podcast Welcome to Night 
Vale takes the form of old-timey local radio show piped in from the small desert town of Night 
Vale. It’s describable as a Lovecraftian take on The News from Lake Wobegon, complete with 
descriptions of unexplainable deaths, monstrosities in the bowling alley, and a member of the 
PTA who is a sentient, psychic, glowing cloud of ectoplasm. While all these come off as horrific, 
particularly considering the penchant for the program to trade in sudden deaths, it never becomes 
something describable as belonging to the horror genre. The reason for this is the lack of 
normativity into which the events in the program enter. While the program’s narrative is horrific 
as contrasted with our world, it is not horrific within the world of Night Vale. In fact, this lack of 
narrative horror at the deeply disturbing events in the town are the source of its comic tone. Yes, 
a pterodactyl materialized during the high school pep-rally, killing 7, but these things happen.  
This kind of unbounded strangeness, while upsetting, fails to be horrific because the 
horror experience remains unbounded. That is, there is no way to gain a firm footing within the 
narrative world of the podcast according to which one might discern what is truly aberrant within 
the world and what is not. Media theorist Isabel Pinedo identifies this “boundedness” as one of 
the defining characteristics of the horror genre, both within its modern and historical horror 
iterations (20). It wouldn’t be absurd to refer to a narrative like that in Welcome to Night Vale as 
avant-garde, or at least it’s far more likely to answer to that label than horror, at least according 
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to the categorical definition used by Mendlesohn. Horror then avoids the avant-garde stumbling 
block of a perpetual horizon of violation by grounding its transgressions in a system of 
normativity that always allows a contrast between that which is normative and that which is not.  
The Critical Possibilities of Horror 
I’ve described above a specific way of understanding the systems of expectation and 
delivery within genre generally and the horror genre specifically, using Phillips’ rhetorical 
maneuver as a tool to illustrate the space between expectation and delivery. The question which 
presents itself now is, “So what?” What does this model allow us to understand about the horror 
genre, and what does this maneuver allow to be accomplished within the horror genre 
specifically? 
The reason this work addresses itself to the horror genre is for the special types of effects 
which are enabled through transgressive communication in a genre which makes overt value 
judgments on ontological and ideological violations. In other words, the horror genre is capable 
of performing unique social action by virtue of the fact that art-horror narrative, as described in 
the first section of the paper, operates in two stages: First, the art horror artifact presents an 
object or performance which is explicitly violational. Second, the narrative/piece responds to this 
non-normativity through the story’s transition to its second act, entailing a repudiation or putting-
down of the horrific elements the narrative presents. Or, at least, this is how art horror has 
traditionally operated. A number of contemporary strains of the genre, those which engage in the 
kind of potentiated maneuvering I’ve described, leave off or leave incomplete the second phase 
of this structure, resulting in a presentation of a horrific or violational statement which is not then 
resolved. 
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A metaphorical description of this process may be useful in order to illuminate the 
call/response structure of traditional horror. In understanding horror as a kind of ritualized 
movement into impurity, what anthropologist Mary Douglas has described in Purity and Danger, 
we can imagine the horror genre raising the blinds on the structure of our categoricity, giving is a 
brief glimpse of the discategorical chaos outside (Douglas 7-9). This chaos is not simply one side 
of the cultural category of orderedness, but is instead the non-categorizable space of pre-semiotic 
urstoff, what Paul Santilli in his treatment of horror and evil describes as a manifestation of what 
Kearney called the chora, resembling the abject--that which precedes the linguistic symbolic 
order, in philosopher Julia Kristeva’s sense, whose work Santilli sites in locating this boundary 
(Santilli 175-176). This showing, this raising of the blind, is the first act of the horror 
performance. The second, traditionally, has been the closing of this blind, the lowering of the 
shade. One can imagine the classical horror artist saying, “See? Thank goodness we’re safe from 
such chaos.” In much postmodern horror, however, which maneuvers within the audience’s 
expectations, the blind is not lowered. The window is left open and we’re left to, at best, imagine 
to ourselves that the raising itself was mere fictionalization--we’re relegated to using the 
boundedness of the experience as a stop-gap for resolution the narrative failed to provide. This 
failure to close what’s been opened is what Pinedo identifies as one of the hallmarks of 
postmodern horror narratives, typified by a cultural tendency away from stability and 
comfortable dualities (24-25).  
This temporal operation of horror in stages can be understood as a manifestation of 
traditional narrative structure. Like any classic story genre, horror functions in three stages: 
equilibrium, disequilibrium, new equilibrium. Unlike other genres, however, the stage of 
disequilibrium within the horror genre does not simply function by showing an undesirable 
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challenge or task to be faced, but what constitutes existential threat through its illustration of a 
state of affairs which cannot be. What faces the protagonist within a science fiction novel or a 
fantasy novel may be something with which she is not familiar, something which requires a new 
paradigm in order to understand, but the horror genre is characterized by the status of these 
challenges as essentially, ontologically threatening. While a science fictional monster may be 
filed away and dismissed as merely existing outside of, though imaginable to, the categories of 
the protagonist, the horror monster instead threatens a rupture of this categoricity itself. 
It is this first-act presentation phase of the horror narrative that Julia Kristeva refers to as 
the abject, that which defies human attempts at categoricity by drawing attention to the very 
constructed-ness of the system wherein it is impossible (1-3). The horror monster, the object of 
emotive horror, is not merely frightening or threatening to life and limb: its threat operates at a 
far more fundamental level. Santilli claims that this emotion is not reducible to mere dread or 
terror, but is instead something more fundamental and cognitive (177). In fact, Carroll states that 
this essential, ontological violation is the very source of the horror genre’s appeal. In his 
“curiosity theory,” Carroll claims that the human need to properly categorize, to order and 
systematize, is itself the origin of our love for horror (180-182). The horror we feel as emotion is, 
although by no means identical, ontologically coterminous with the fascination we feel in the 
face of the horror genre. Both our interest and our horror originate not in the categorical threat or 
corruption of the horror object, but its very non-categoricity.  
But what if a specific kind of maneuver is performed against the audience’s expectation 
of closure? What if, instead of the above-mentioned ontic curtain being closed, it’s left wide 
open, or the ideology of the narrative hero is left wounded by the appearance of this categorically 
transgressive display? Horror as a set of formal attributes and as a specific kind of audience 
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response is predicated on the closure of the first act, the repudiation of what’s been presented. 
The window is closed, the categories are restored, the story ends. Presumably, the curiosity of 
the audience has been sated, and the existential terror of the protagonist has been resolved. But 
what if this doesn’t occur? What happens in the case of Pinedo’s postmodern horror? What 
happens if the form of the horror deployment is a maneuvered mismatch to the expected 
position? 
The response to this is troubling. In Gender Trouble, theorist Judith Butler uses that title-
phrase to describe acts that don’t simple transgress boundaries of acceptable gender 
performance, but instead draw attention again to the constructed-ness of these boundaries (xxix-
xxxi). Rather than simply being troublesome, these acts trouble categoricity itself--they are the 
abject as agent of ideological shift. These kinds of acts bear a sort of family resemblance to the 
operation of the horror genre. Drag shows, the example Butler uses in the introduction to her 
work, function by showing what is categorically troubling: a man who is woman, a woman who 
is a man. This troubling occurs simultaneously in two ways. In the first, the female appearance of 
the drag outfit seems to declare a mismatch with the male interior. In the second, the male 
appearance of the drag performer seems to declare a mismatch with what is taken to be a female, 
or not prohibitively masculine, interior (186-188). To draw an analogue to the horror genre, a 
drag show which attempted to adhere to the two-act structure typical of classical horror would 
end with each performer taking off their outfits and declaring, “Don’t worry: I’m really a man!” 
or worse, with the audience doing the same. Obviously, this does not happen, and the 
discategoricity of non-resolution forms the foreground of the performance itself. The fact of non-
resolution, of things not being put back “as they should be” to match a normative ontology, 
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constitutes the troubling potential of these performances. Here, discategoricity is a source of 
powerful social potential. 
What I’d like to claim here is that the horror genre, when it employs the transgressive 
performance of the ‘generic maneuver,’ gains the potential to perform a kind of ‘trouble’ on the 
categoricity of the artistic objects, and perhaps too on the audience who are called upon to relate 
to the story’s protagonists. The possibility for this kind of narrative troubling potentiated in the 
non-closure of the horror performance is to be located in what Carroll identifies as a necessary 
element within the horror experience: audience alignment (88-96). It is not enough in a horror 
narrative to have a categorically violational element--it must also be reacted to in a certain way 
by the story’s normative world, generally the protagonist, and the audience must share this 
alignment. In other words, the audience and the protagonist must share the same opinion or 
perspective on the horror objects in the art piece in order for it to constitute an example of the 
horror genre. If this sympathy is not present, the art-horror will have been a failure, or will no 
longer be describable as horror as such.  
Another concept from Carroll that might be useful in understanding this movement, as 
well as the role of sympathy in imagining possible effects of the horror genre, is that of the 
distinction between believing and entertaining (79-80) The problem with emotive responses to 
the horror genre, according to Carroll, is that it simultaneously requires sufficient audience buy-
in to elicit an emotional response, a buy-in which would seem to require a tacit audience belief in 
the images and statements provided, while also being a contained, artistic, fictionalized. To 
frame this problem as a question, how can an audience respond emotively, viscerally, to what 
they believe to be not only a fiction, but a fiction characterized by its very impossibility? If the 
origin of the emotion or horror is a kind of epistemological troubling, how can this emotion 
36 
 
coexist with my conscious understanding of the fact that the scenes and objects presented in the 
film are fictional? The answer, according to Carroll, can’t simply lie in a two-stage 
belief/refutation process, whereby the audience first believes the monster is real, only to 
consciously banish this belief (83). The reason for this is that, if the audience believed for even a 
moment that a horror monster, let’s say half-lobster/half-man, were real, they would immediately 
run screaming from the theater, not merely jump in their seats. The solution Carroll finds to this 
quandary is in the distinction between true belief and simply entertaining an idea. To entertain an 
idea is, for Carroll, to emulate or simulate true belief, or to imagine oneself affected by their 
adoption, without truly accepting these objects, such as man/lobster hybrids, as factual entities.  
So, it is not the case that the audience now believes in a world in which the categories 
transgressed by this film remain broken or disrupted, but it may be the case that they may now be 
able to entertain a world in which they have remained disrupted, and too entertain the possibility 
of this continued disruption as a kind of equilibrium itself. To return to the possible effect of this 
idea-entertaining on the equilibrium-centric structure of the narrative, if the audience is able to 
entertain the idea of a world in which the horror monster is, for example, not truly evil, but 
instead an ally in disguise, this idea-entertaining may be allowed to work on the same plane of 
abstraction as the categoricity the horror objects of the narrative occupy. In other words, 
assuming the notion of idea-entertaining to be conceptually sound, and assuming that the 
audience has opened a suspended space in themselves where fictional assertions are allowed to 
have emotional or abstract effects, a maneuvering away from audience expectation may be able 
to affect an impact in terms of the expectant categories according to which horror narrative is 
comprehensible.  
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In order to discern what this kind of maneuver might mean, it would require working 
something out which hasn’t been treated here: precisely what it might entail to entertain a notion. 
One imaginable benefit of the fantasy genres is that allows us to imagine possible worlds, and 
this mode of imagination might be close to what Carroll has in mind when he talks about the 
potentialized state the horror genre takes advantage of for effect. The question of what impact 
specifically the imagining of an alternative world is capable of creating in an audience is one far 
too vast to be explored here. It is almost a truism, however, that the experience, even in 
fictionalized form, of a world which has hitherto been conceived as impossible will have the 
impact of expanding an audience’s sense of what is conceivable in the world. In other words, 
although fiction will likely not change the audience’s notion of what the world is, it will 
necessarily impact their conception of what worlds are imaginable. This seems a decent enough 
first step in conceptualizing a space for horror fiction’s critical effects.  
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Chapter 4:  Theorizing Night of the Living Dead 
From more general theorization, let’s turn to specific instance in the history of the 
contemporary horror genre, The Night of the Living Dead, by George A. Romero. In this chapter, 
I will explore the operation of both intertextual presupposition and of the sociohistorical 
operation of monstrous “unreason” as they demonstrate themselves within this film. I’ve chosen 
this film as my artifact both for its popularity and influence--it essentially began the modern 
dispensation of zombie narratives--and for the rich suite of cultural background from which it 
emerged. I will begin with a general discussion of the film’s historical and social background 
before moving into a more detailed account of its two-act structure, typical of the horror genre 
generally.  
Background of the Living Dead, Personal and Social 
In this film, a group of survivors hole up in a small home in Pennsylvania while a zombie 
outbreak, suggested to be alien in origin, causes the buried and unburied dead to rise back to life. 
The zombies must feed, and the survivors hold off against a siege of hungry and decaying 
shambling figures, succumbing to the horde one-by-one. Eventually, only one of the survivors--
Ben--is left. As the outbreak seems to be subsiding, he tentatively emerges from their stronghold, 
only to be shot dead by a group of local militia-men, who ostensibly mistook him for a zombie. 
The film drew attention at the time of its release for its casting decision to make Ben black, a 
near first in American genre films. 
 The Night of the Living Dead was released at the apex of the Vietnam War, a year before 
the Vietnamization of the conflict, which transferred the burden of maintaining the war’s 
progress to the natives of the nation combined with a troop withdrawal. Even while the film was 
derided for its portrayals of graphic and lingering violence, audiences for this film were also 
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inundated with unprecedented imagery of the violence in the East, with up-to-the-minute 
coverage of village-burnings and napalm-bombings forcing Americans to confront the 
incomprehensible violence in which they were implicated. The hordes of men who returned from 
Vietnam shambled back into American consciousness as walking contradictions, simultaneously 
participating in the narratives of heroism constructed around military service, even while their 
performed violence and incumbent failure had been telecast into the minds of the American 
public.  
 In combination with the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, the Cold War raged on, with 
hostilities continuing to compound with the Red Threat, who were perceived as a non-rational 
hivemind, bent on the proliferation of their collectivist ideology. If the violence we performed 
was monstrous, the repercussions of a failure to act would be too dire to consider. The now 
cliched “better red than dead” sloganeering of this era is a testament to the degree to which 
Americans perceived a fall to the red menace not so much as the conclusive military obliteration 
of previous wars, but as a more ambiguous loss of self, a collapse into a collectivity that 
threatened the individuality promised by the American project.  
 From the perspective of the sociocultural/grotesque, this combination of factors strongly 
contributed to situation in which the threatening actors in the society, the scions of unreason, 
were both those who, in Monloen’s model, were unable to contribute to the American industrial 
project, as well as those foreign agents who were not simply failing to contribute to the Western 
rationalist objective, but were embodying its antithesis in the form of the Communist project. 
The men who returned from Vietnam emerged as broken humans, victims of an effacement 
agency which robbed them of the ability to become one with the American vision of collective 
individuality. With us but still “over there,” they constituted a grim reflection of our Western 
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vision. The Communists too presented an image of inverted collectivity, a sort of hypertrophy of 
American industrialism. Into such a cultural current Night of the Living Dead entered.  
 George A. Romero himself participated in a conflicted upbringing, simultaneously 
partaking of the Western project while estranged from it through the tension of immigration and 
integration. Romero’s father considered himself a Spaniard, born of parents who lived in Cuba 
during its most successful years. George’s father, also George, married a Lithuanian woman 
named Ann Dvorsky, and they had George, who claims he was raised in a household in which 
both Spanish and Lithuanian speech were verboten--it was to be only American English 
(Romero, xvi). They lived in a predominantly Italian neighborhood in which George Romero 
says he was called a “spic,” and was often mistaken for being Puerto Rican, as “Latino” during 
that time was often shorthand for someone of Puerto Rican descent. This conflicted with 
George’s father’s hatred of this association, believing the Puerto Ricans to be turning New York 
into a sewer (Romero, xvii). This dialectic of integration and friction formed the backdrop to 
George A. Romero’s later generativity, his portrayals of unity and division.  
 From the perspective of Monleon’s sociohistorical treatment, this attempted “coming into 
the social body” by Romero’s family may be seen as a kind of invasion in the inverse, as 
immigrant populations were often themselves seen as harbingers of monstrous change within the 
reasoned communities of the “real” Americans. While this immigration, this integration, was 
seen as an essential quality of the American experience, it is impossible to avoid the 
contradictions inherent in a culture which simultaneously gloried in the acceptance into the 
social body anyone who wished to do so, and refused right to entry anyone who refused to cast 
off their history and participate in the project of integration. This has always been a distinctly 
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American concept, as in the injunction to “Kill the Indian, Save the Man” in the forced 
integration of Native American populations only a few decades prior.  
 As an aside, it bears mentioning that Monleon’s treatment of the sociohistorical function 
of the Gothic restricts itself to European examples, and the American project differed somewhat. 
While, according to Monleon, the integration of unreasoned populations into the reasoned 
European body was an instance of conflict and tension, the American relationship with this 
process is a bit more fraught. While there has been a robust history of discrimination against 
immigrant populations in the United States, the US has also adopted a sort of fantasy theme 
surrounding the integration of these populations. Given this objective, the monstrosity of 
unreason within the American project is perhaps best imagined not as a monstrosity of 
insurgence, as insurgence is a necessary precursor to integration, but a failure of integration 
consequent to that insurgence. Immigration is well and truly American, just as long as those 
concerned are able to well and truly “melt” into the idiomatic Melting Pot.  
Subtexts of Unreason in Night of the Living Dead 
While there have been diverse interpretations of The Night of the Living Dead--a work so 
paradigmatic in its inspiration of a new genre dispensation is likely to generate such discussion--
it’s worth looking for a moment at Romero’s own interpretation of his film’s subtext. Romero 
himself claims that the misinterpretation of his film has led to a great deal of its success. The true 
subtext of the film, he claims, is one of failure, not valiant resistance. He says the failure of he 
survivors to survive is not simply a result of the inexorable tide of the coming hordes, but instead 
results from their failure to truly come together in their resistance. As a result of this failure to 
integrate, they bring about their own demise.  
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 What do we make of this from the perspective of Unreason? Given our discussion above 
of the function of the failure to integrate as a site of unreason, the failure of this film’s characters 
to correlate and integrate their objectives can be seen as a microcosmic mirroring of the failure to 
integrate with those zombies who constitute the film’s antagonists. In Monelon’s theory, a failure 
to integrate with the social body is what creates sites of “unreason.” The narrative presented in 
Night of the Living Dead presents two such sites--one of the zombies as an unreasoned mass, and 
the other of the survivors failing to constitute together a reasoned body. It is both then a narrative 
of monstrosity, and one of a failure to respond to monstrosity in a properly reflexive and 
integrated way. One compounds the other, and they each become functions of a broader 
unreasoning.  
 In the context of a sociohistorical interpretation, the function of the zombies in this film 
can be better understood through an examination of their origin. If monsters began on the 
outskirts and then immigrated to the center of the social body, whence came this film’s zombies? 
Within the film, it’s briefly mentioned on a radio broadcast that a probe has recently returned 
from near Venus, though has exploded in the earth’s atmosphere. It’s never made clear if this is 
the genesis of the zombie outbreak, but it’s generally adopted as such. The very inexplicability of 
the outbreak contributes to its monstrosity. Were the zombies simply scientized and explained 
away, they would cease to be threateningly human, grotesquely reminiscent of ourselves. As it is 
however, they remain ultimately unexplained (at least until the film’s sequels), making them feel 
as inexorable as an act of god.  
 Zombies are almost unique in the annals of popular horror for in their resemblance of us--
they are literally our friends, our family, our neighbors, only distorted and modified to a kind of 
paradigmatically unreasoning mindlessness that casts them as negativized mirrors of ourselves. 
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They are us through a glass darkly. If the monstrous is, after all, a grotesque combination of what 
should not be combined, what could be more sacrosanct than ourselves? What could be more 
damnable than a version of ourselves lacking that quality according to which we are human? 
 Here is a possible sociohistorical casting of the system of relations I’ve above described, 
within an historical context. While it is likely not conclusive, and likely not comprehensively 
reflective of Romero’s intentions in his portrayal, it provides an interesting lens through which to 
view the events of the film. If the zombies in the film are reflections, as Monleon would claim, 
of our sense of the origination of unreason within our culture, they may be construed as 
representative of the same genus of perceived mindless contamination and dehumanized 
humanity on display in the spread and intensification of the communist threat. By the same token 
that the Communist threat was not characterized by an absence of reason, an absence of industry, 
but rather by a perversion and problematic recasting of these elements, the zombies in this film 
are not hideously inhuman--they are hideously human. As Stieg would attest, the very humanity, 
the very mundanity of their mein is the foundation of the grotesquery they present. If we were to 
accept such an interpretation, then what to make of the survivors? They are us. They are us in all 
our variety: black, white, man, woman, old, young. Their failure, as Romero identifies it, is the 
failure of their perceived strength, and an echo of Romero’s own history: a failure to integrate.  
Night of the Living Dead and the Two-Act Horror Function 
Turning now to the presuppositional operation of the horror genre, how can this 
understanding of horror as a two-act performance from grotesque representation to judgement be 
applied to an understanding of Night of the Living Dead, and how can this interplay be 
productively understood as a manifestation of Monleon’s sociohistorical architecture? Just as 
preceding horror films, among which there were a number of zombie stories, Night of the Living 
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Dead plays according to the rule of the two-part structure inherent within the architecture of the 
horror narrative. An absence of audience expectation would render the story a non-starter, while 
a failure of resolution would render it not a story at all. Romero’s film, however, provides a 
subversion of expectation for audiences accustomed to the horror structures typical of Fifties and 
Sixties horror.  
 To begin, with it bears mentioning that audiences experiencing Night of the Living Dead 
did not have the broad base of zombie-based horror experiences and expectations that a modern 
viewer might bring to these types of films. Zombies are our current monster du jour. In film, 
television, comics, video games, and podcasts, modern audiences are thoroughly versed in the 
lore of the zombie invasion. Given the modern effulgence of zombie-based media, it may be 
difficult to imagine a horror-media-substrate in which zombies were not thought of primarily in 
the form of invasion, but as individual monsters more typical of classical horror-monster 
narratives. Zombies still existed, certainly, but not in the forms to which modern viewers, 
readers, and players have become accustomed. In films such as White Zombie, I Walked with a 
Zombie, Revolt of the Zombies, and numerous others, all predecessors to modern zombie 
interpretations, these monsters do not travel in the hordes familiar to modern audiences. Instead, 
they are individuals, often the creation of voodoo priests, perhaps more reminiscent of a 
spiritualized Frankenstein’s monster than the modern invasion narratives familiar to modern 
viewers.  
 In addition to this difference, the zombie films before Night of the Living Dead, such as 
they were, largely centered around zombies springing from Caribbean and African locales, 
allowing these monsters and their creators to be cast as foreigners not only in an ontological 
sense, but also possessing a physicality which marked them as geographically other, being as 
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there were most often black or of Eastern descent, flagging them as inherent outsiders. In both I 
Walked with a Zombie and White Zombie, the zombies on display are dark skinned, bestial, 
brutish. They are portrayed as sufficiently inhuman in their mein--filthy bodies and bugged out 
eyes--to flag as grotesque even if they were not rendered mindless my the actions of their 
creators. These monsters are of the true Outsider type, identified by Monleon as belonging to 
early stages of Gothic development, wherein the horror of the narrative derives from that which 
is properly, geographically Outside the social body. If the normative Western heroes of these 
films exemplify the normativity of the enlightened social body, their monstrous foils constitute 
the most foreign threat imaginable.  
 While the horror artifacts of the era preceding Night of the Living Dead may have 
acclimated viewers to threatening outsiders, monsters emerging from the periphery of society, 
and even to the possibility of monsters as grotesque reinterpretations of ourselves ala stories such 
as Jekyll and Hyde, Romero’s paradigm marked the first instance of a monstrosity that 
encompassed the whole of the social body, a monster that wasn’t simply “us,” but “Us.” In Night 
of the Living Dead, the zombies are not foreigners. They are not distant threats from exotic 
locales which hapless Westerners may encounter through ill luck. Rather, they are us. The 
zombies of Romero’s creation emerge from within the social body, in a visceral sense ARE the 
social body, and are far more emblematic of Monleon’s later stages of Gothic development than 
preceding horror narratives.  
 The zombies presented in Night of the Living Dead are not then merely some thematic 
amplification of preceding zombie tropes, but are instead demonstrative of an entirely novel 
paradigm, the Zombie Invasion (Bishop 94). While in the other movies mentioned, it became the 
actions of the protagonists which unwittingly brought them in contact with the zombie threat, 
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Night of the Living Dead brought the threat home, foisting them upon the group of survivors with 
a suddennes that entirely defies any attempt to frame them as paradigmatically foreign. In fact, 
given their emergence from the very ground, it is arguable that the zombies portrayed in 
Romero’s films are perhaps more native to this land than ourselves.  
Notably, while the zombie narratives coming before Night of the Living Dead frame 
zombies as invasive anomalies, things emerging from the periphery, essentially from outside the 
social body, Romero’s dispensation shifted this focus to zombies as a threat of replacement for 
the social body. The very collectivity of this new threat is the key to its threatening nature. While 
previous films had portrayed monstrous invasion--from blobs to aliens to demons--Romero’s 
zombies were the first instance of invasive insiders, monsters native to the social body while 
simultaneously entirely inimical to it. The zombies here are predators, and the siege setup of the 
film seems to portray the conflict as a zero sum game which must culminate either with the 
zombies’ elimination or our own.  
 Placed within the established horror framework of expectation/delivery, the Romero 
zombie paradigm does not simply subvert audience expectations as to delivery, but establishes an 
entirely new network of expectations, substantially different from those of the preceding zombie 
films. Zombie scholar Kyle Bishop has described this shift as one from a framing of the narrative 
goal as the reestablishment of normative society to instead one of survival (96). How does one 
go about simply eliminating the threat when the threat is so all-encompassing that it threatens to 
replace the normativity against which it articulates itself? 
 Horror films as well as zombie films preceding Night of the Living Dead also tend to 
deliver a different sort of narrative resolution from Romero’s film, one far more steeped in the 
classical models of narrative resolution. In the three pre-Romero films mentioned above, the 
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narrative resolution is predictable: the zombie(s) die, their creator dies, the heroes stand battered 
but victorious. Within such narratives, what is the threat? Simply the death of the hero. If the 
chiselled American is unable to put an end to the Zombie threat, he will die, simple as that. The 
zombie-creating priest may survive to wreak havoc again, but it will be a havoc of the periphery, 
never coming close to the heart of the social body. Perhaps the priest will be destroyed in the 
sequel. 
 In traditional horror architecture, the narrative structure is framed as Society vs. Monster, 
where the combined mores and standards of the social body are articulated as resistance to the 
monstrous threat, neutralizing it such as to return the situation to the status quo. In Night of the 
Living Dead this narrative mechanism is subverted, and the society presented, the ragtag group 
of survivors is incapable of aligning their intentions in such a way as to resist the zombie threat. 
The zombie threat too is reframed, no longer captured by simple designation as an Other. While 
the zombies remain grotesquely foreign, they become a sort of social assemblage unto 
themselves, constituting nothing so much as a hideously unified counter-society to the 
disorganized normativity of the survivors. With the zombies presenting such a monstrous unity 
to the disjointed efforts of the film’s heroes, can the victory of the disorganized remnants of 
normalcy be thought of as an unqualified return to the status quo? 
 So, given this subversion of audience expectation as to the resolution of the monster 
narrative, what expectations have been explicitly violated, and what is the function of these 
violations? 
 First, within the zombie tradition prior to Night of the Living Dead, victory is portrayed 
as a kind of normative inevitability, where even a failure to defeat the monster is imagined as a 
reaffirmation of social normativity. If the hero fails, if the zombies win, if the priest continues his 
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reign of terror, the monsters in traditional narrative architecture remain monstrous. They 
continue to be outsiders, peripheral invaders and Others, operating on the outskirts of a 
normative society which will, presumably, continue to see them as exemplifying an outsider 
status. To put it in brief, even if the monster wins, there will still be a society to perceive that 
monster as monstrous--they will continue to be an outsider to a normative inside.  
 By violating this expectation as to the presumed stability of the social status quo, Night of 
the Living Dead posited the possibility of the monstrous replacement of the social body, a reality 
reflective of the social circumstances within which it emerged. If the monsters in the Zombie 
Invasion paradigm are victorious, they become the normative center. The game within a Romero 
style zombie film is, as above, zero sum. Either the zombie threat will be neutralized, or it will 
become something like a zombie planet, a grim visioned imagined in later Romero zombie films, 
notably Day of the Dead, where the survivors are themselves peripheral outsiders to a status quo 
wherein zombies have replaced humans as the dominant surface-dwelling species.  
 Second, the unity of the social body against which monsters articulate themselves is an 
operating assumption of much horror narrative, in which the Monstrous is portrayed as 
antithetical to the unified front of non-monstrous normativity. The chiselled American is 
recognizable as the hero of preceding zombie films because he’s exemplary of chiselled-
Americanness. It is presumed that, although he may act alone in his crusade against the foreign 
zombie threat, he operates with the implicit sanction of a society that also perceives the 
narrative’s monsters as monstrous. While he may only be the only one aware of the threat, his 
solitude is only the more reflective of his need to bring the normative Inside to bear on the 
Outside threat.  
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 Night of the Living Dead subverts this expectation in great fashion, with the failure of the 
characters portrayed to integrate and unify the very cause of their failure--the zombies are 
monstrous, yes, but their siege only succeeds by virtue of the failure of the non-zombie 
characters to come together in a body as tightly knit as the animalistic social body of the zombies 
themselves. Night of the Living Dead asks what happens when the Inside is put under sufficient 
pressure from the Outside threat that its assumption of unity and coherence comes under 
question. The answer to this question is unequivocal: when placed in a position where characters 
are tasked to either integrate and unify or die, the film ends with a montage of carnage, and our 
hero is thrown on a pyre with his fellow dead. The Inside, Romero argues, may be less unified 
than it might seem. 
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V: Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, we have moved from a general discussion of the horror genre 
as a demonstration of agentive unreason within Monelon’s framework through a discussion of 
the presuppositional, two-act structure of the horror genre, as well as how this two-part structure 
presents a potential site for critical action. We’ve then explored a popular example of this genre 
in the form of George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead, which reflects notions of unreason 
both from within Romero’s own life and within the culture, entertainment and political, from 
which it was written. 
 As a site of further study, although the two-act structure of horror seems to dovetail 
decently with Monleon’s sociohistorical model of the gothic, it would be interesting to see how it 
plays with the other theorists’ models of horror genre. This study, although it has made nods to 
the works of numerous horror theorists, has restricted its synthesis primarily to the works of Jose 
Monleon and Edwards & Graulund, whose theories of sociohistorical gothicism and grotesque 
aesthetic have been treated as two expressions of the same theoretical move. What might be 
generated if these theories were united with a theoretical approach from outside of literary 
theory, such as either feminist or critical race theory? The latter would be a particularly 
interesting lens through which to examine Night of the Living Dead. Because of the genetic 
relationships between divergent theories of horror narrativity and aesthetic, any such 
combinatoriality is likely to open some interesting parallax; what has been presented here is only 
one such conjunction among many.  
 Within this study’s purview specifically, further work could also be done in disentangling 
the notions of personal/psychological unreason and cultural/sociohistorical unreason in their 
operation within the field of horror narrative. While it may be in poor taste to attempt to 
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disarticulate these two domains, the personal and the social seem, at least in the case of this 
study’s artifact, to be easily enough discerned to generate interesting results. But what are the 
boundaries of this distinction, and how safe can it be to make such a distinction? This is will 
remain for the time an open question. 
 The horror genre generates perennial interest, and an overview of the topic creates the 
impression there have nearly been as many works written on the genre as such as have been 
written WITHIN the genre. It is likely that, just as each exemplar of the horror genre may 
indicate something about the conditions of its authorship, historical and personal, each example 
of theory meant to explain these works will similarly demonstrate something about their author 
and the circumstances of their origin. This historical changeability is similarly the source both of 
continued interest in this body of theory and in the works which generate it. In line with Freud’s 
theory of the unheimlich, horror literature and horror theory each present us with the impression 
of something new, but perhaps only because it’s been forgotten. They are each parts of the 
genre’s uncanny mirror, which shows us what is bizarre, threatening, grotesque, troubling, 
uncanny, but only through the use of what is eerily familiar. What we fear most is what we 
already know. 
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